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This study builds on prior scholarly works on institutions and entrepreneurship by examining the 
process of transitions and institutional obstacles that force serial entrepreneurs’ shift to operate in 
the formal or informal sector after entrepreneurial business failures. Using insights from 32 serial 
entrepreneurs in Ghana, a framework was developed and utilized to explicate how the pull and 
push motivations for the transition into or persisting with formality or informality after business 
failure unfolds over time. Our analysis sheds light on the processes and effects of the motivations 









Society has historically celebrated stories of highly successful entrepreneurs (Sandage, 2005; 
Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). Columns of trade and industrial magazines are often devoted to 
their achievements and successes, often attributed to superior intuition and leadership style. Less 
apparent, however, are stories of failed ventures of entrepreneurs especially in emerging market 
context (Amankwah-Amoah, Boso and Antwi-Agyei, 2016; Rhoads, 2016; Schwarz, Watson, and 
Callan, 2011). A plethora of scholarly works have demonstrated that many entrepreneurs 
experience failures before successful re-entry into entrepreneurship (Hsu, Shinnar, Powell and Betty, 
2017a; Hsu, Wiklund and Cotton, 2017b). Although transition from failed venture to new venture 
formation is encouraged by public policy makers and governments (European Commission, 2011), 
much of the current scholarly discourse around the issue has circumvented the motives and 
dynamics of transitions back into entrepreneurship after business failures. Serial entrepreneurs 
may continue to operate in the same mode (i.e. formal or informal) or shift from formal to 
informal sector and vice versa. Informal institutions are created and operated by “socially shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially 
sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006, p. 5), whereas formal institutions include legal 
and political systems, government regulations and rules (Peng, 2002). 
Given that a legal status offers the “governmental stamp of approval” (Assenova and Sorenson, 
2017), this is an incentive for failed entrepreneurs to re-enter the formal sector as formal status can 
offer legitimacy and allow entrepreneurs to attract investors and finance. On the other hand, by 
opting out of the legal boundaries, entrepreneurs are able to sidestep bureaucratic barriers and 
eliminate the cost of complying with numerous government rules and regulations which can 
constrain and curtail formal organizations (Debrah, 2007; Loayza, Oviedo and Servén, 2005; 
Rauch, 1991). Around 50% of economic activity in the developing world is in the informal sector 
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(McGahan, 2012). Furthermore, two-thirds of jobs in developing countries are in the informal 
sector (The Economist, 2016).  
In spite of these two compelling motivations and options for failed entrepreneurs, we lack a solid 
understanding as to the process through which entrepreneurs gravitate towards the formal or 
informal sector after business failure. Indeed, “failure is undertheorized in organizational studies 
in favor of studying organizational change and success” (Schwarz Watson and Callan., 2011, p. 
312). Although much of the existing research on entrepreneurship has explored firms in the formal 
setting with clear rules of law and a stronger degree of enforcement (Assenova and Sorenson, 
2017; Webb, Ireland and Ketchen, 2014), there is also a need to examine whether business failure 
experience actually fosters new learning and encourages entrepreneurs to shift from prior status of 
the failed venture (e.g. from informal to formal status and vice versa). This is particularly 
important given that many organizations in the developing world grow and evolve away from the 
informal economy.  Many of the contemporary industrial policy debates such as the role of 
government in promoting manufacturing and protecting of local industries are well noted in the 
literature (Andreoni and Chang, 2018; Andreoni, Chang and Scazzieri, 2018; Andreoni, Frattini 
and Prodi, 2017) and can be resolved by creating policy frameworks that facilitate learning from 
the past and failures. The main aim of this paper is to examine the process of transitions and 
institutional obstacles that force serial entrepreneurs shift to operate in the formal or informal 
sector after entrepreneurial business failures.  
This paper advances business failure, innovation and entrepreneurship literature in several ways. 
First, although the reasons why and how some entrepreneurs are able to bounce back after 
business failure is of interest to entrepreneurship scholars (Hayward, Forster, Sarasvathy and 
Fredrickson, 2010), research in the area has paid limited attention to the re-entry route (i.e. formal 
or informal sector) for bouncing back. Accordingly, the paper contributes to the literature by 
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developing a framework to capture the pull and push motivations as well as the different re-entry 
routes. In addition, in spite of the burgeoning body of research on business failure (Ucbasaran, 
Shepherd Lockett and Lyon, 2013; Zhang, Amankwah-Amoah and Beaverstock, 2019) and 
entrepreneurs’ transition from informal to formal markets (Sutter, Webb, Kistruck, Ketchen and 
Ireland, 2017), this issue of transition after business failure has thus far received scant scholarly 
attention. By conceptualizing entrepreneurs’ routes for bouncing back after business failure, our 
study deepens our understanding of how different individuals’ motivations and experiences can 
lead to successive entrepreneurial engagement. Moreover, although there is a body of research on 
entrepreneurship in both formal and informal economies (Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi and Ireland, 
2013; Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland and Sirmon, 2009), much of the existing research has focused on 
firms in developed economies. Thus, the paper contributes to the theoretical understanding of 
serial entrepreneurship (Westhead, Ucbasaran and Wright, 2005; Westhead and Wright, 1998) by 
using insights from a developing economy to shed light on successive entrepreneurial 
engagement.  
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. First, reviews of the literature on 
entrepreneurial business failure, and formal and informal economies are presented. We then set 
out the research setting and our approaches to data collection and analysis. The penultimate 
section articulates the findings on how the different serial entrepreneurs gravitate towards formal 
or informal sectors. After setting out the findings, we outline the implications of the study. 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS FAILURE AND 
INSTITUTIONS  
The past two decades can be regarded as the “Golden Age” of business failure research with 
burgeoning streams of scholarly works on the causes and consequences of failure (e.g. 
Amankwah-Amoah and Wang, 2019a; Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004; Shepherd, 2003). Since the 
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turn of the twenty-first century, business failure has emerged as one of the pivotal issues in 
entrepreneurship research (DeTienne, McKelvie and Chandler, 2015). By entrepreneurial business 
failure, we are referring to situations where inability to mobilize prerequisite expertise and 
resources to tackle old and emerging threats culminates in the collapse of an entrepreneurial 
venture (Zhang et al., 2019). Failure often stems from misalignment of the organization to external 
changes leading to depleting resources and eventual collapse, whereas exit may stem from a 
decision to close the business irrespective of the financial circumstances. This means financially 
stable or profitable businesses can be closed down by retirement of the owners (Watson and 
Everett, 1993). Past studies indicate that lack of market knowledge and prior experience 
(Schaeffer, 2006), as well as overconfidence (Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin, 2006) can create 
the conditions leading to decision errors, strategic misalignment, and business failure.  
Another line of research has demonstrated that external factors such as market liberalization and 
the accompanying rapid influx of new firms can create conditions for increased mortality among 
new entrants as well as incumbents (Knott and Posen, 2005; Silverman, Nickerson and Freeman, 
1997). Prior scholarly works have demonstrated that organizations teetering on the brink of 
collapse also exhibit characteristics such as depletion of financial resources through waste and 
mismanagement (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004), and human capital depletion through personnel 
mobility and jumping ship (Amankwah-Amoah, 2018a; Jiang, Cannella, Xia and Semadeni, 
2017). 
Recent contributions to this line of research have highlighted that after venture failure, the 
options available to the failed entrepreneurs include becoming serial entrepreneurs (Westhead, 
Ucbasaran and Wright, 2005), opting out of entrepreneurship (Hsu et al., 2017a), and working for 
other firms. Previous research has noted that some former entrepreneurs work temporarily for 
other firms before starting another venture to help them develop “bounceability” – the ability to 
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mobilize new and old resources, knowledge, lessons and expertise to launch a new venture (Hsu, 
Wiklund and Cotton, 2017b; Westhead and Wright, 1998). The transition from failed venture to 
another tends to differ and is punctuated by a period of deliberation shaped by personal and 
environmental factors (see Hessels, Grilo, Thurik and van der Zwan, 2011).  
Prior scholarly works have emphasized that to learn from business failure, organizations 
need to develop effective mechanisms to develop knowledge and transfer knowledge about failure 
as entrepreneurs’ transition from one failed venture to new venture formations (see Amankwah-
Amoah, 2016; Amankwah-Amoah and Wang, 2019a, 2019b; Cope, 2011; Zhang et al., 2019). 
Besides the direct effect of learning from failure, some studies indicate that the mere possession of 
knowledge about business failure is unlikely to be translated into potentially valuable knowledge 
unless one recognizes the context-specific effects of lessons from failure (Amankwah-Amoah, 
2016). A fundamental thesis of entrepreneurial business failure is that some individuals learn from 
failure whilst others move on, learning little or nothing from their prior experience (Cope, 2011; 
Zhang et al., 2019). Serial entrepreneurs who fail to make use of available information or prior 
experience in establishing new ventures can create space for re-emergence of prior errors and 
mistakes (Amankwah-Amoah, 2018b). In addition, prior experience of business failure can 
actually be an asset when seeking venture capitalists (Landier, 2004). Such investors actually view 
prior business failure favorably, thereby incentivizing individuals with prior business failure to re-
enter entrepreneurship (McGrath, 2011). Indeed, they may be reluctant to invest in a new venture 
“if the founder has never undergone failure” (McGrath, 2011, p. 79).  
Formal and Informal Institutions 
According to North (1990, p. 3), institutions are the “rules of the game in a society” that 
influences individuals and firms’ activities and actions. There is an accumulated body of research 
in the strategy and international business domains that has demonstrated that institutions 
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encompass both formal and informal components (Amankwah-Amoah and Wang, 2019; Peng, 
2002; Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013; Ofori-Dankwa and Julian, 2013). By informal economy, 
we are referring to entrepreneurial activities carried out by individuals whose businesses are 
“unregistered or otherwise untracked and thus unregulated” (McGahan, 2012, p. 12). A growing 
body of research indicates that one of the unique features of informal firms is that they perform the 
same activities and functions as firms in the formal sector, but they do so under the radar of 
government and formal institutions (Assenova and Sorenson, 2017). Thus, the informal market is 
where economic exchange occurs outside of formal regulations and infrastructures (Webb, 
Tihanyi, Ireland and Sirmon, 2009).  
In the informal sector, economic activities are unofficially conducted by unregistered firms 
(LaPorta and Schleifer, 2008). Besides the lack of legitimacy, prior research points out that 
unregistered start-ups can deprive the entrepreneurs of access to scarce resources and increase the 
risk of subsequent business failure (Williams, Martinez‐Perez and Kedir, 2017). The informal 
entrepreneurs can actually provide legal goods and services to society at large. Nevertheless, 
government infrastructure that supports firms’ activities such as quality roads and local education 
systems often do not require firms to be registered to accrue the benefits and thereby encourage 
informality (Assenova and Sorenson, 2017; Maloney, 2004). Indeed, lack of confidence in 
government and government institutions can actually undermine the legitimacy conferred on 
formal organizations (Assenova and Sorenson, 2017). Although firms in the formal sector 
generally outperform those in the informal sector (Assenova and Sorenson, 2017), the effects 
might be universal given that some firms in the informal sector can thrive and outwit their 
counterparts.  
Historically, the government has perceived the informal economy as a barrier to the development 
of the formal economy, however, there are some indications that it may offer a viable path to 
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economic and entrepreneurial development (Debrah, 2007). Today, bureaucratic obstacles and 
heavy regulatory burdens remain a hindrance to entrepreneurial development. One strand of 
scholarly works has indicated that corruption remains a feature in both developed and developing 
economies, which can curtail or shape the nature of entrepreneurial activities (Tonoyan, 
Strohmeyer, Habib and Perlitz, 2010). Some scholars have suggested that weak formal institutions 
and rampant corruption reduces confidence in entrepreneurial development (Tonoyan et al., 2010).  
Given the prevalence of corruption in many developing countries (Olken and Pande, 2012), 
entrepreneurs may be tempted to shift their activities from the formal to the informal sector in 
order to avoid the bureaucratic pitfalls and “red-tape”. Given the legal and social constraints on 
failed entrepreneurs re-entering entrepreneurship, many may therefore drift from previous 
business domains, e.g. from operating in the formal sector to operating outside the boundaries of 
the legal system in the informal sector (Assenova andSorenson, 2017; Debrah, 2007). By opting 
for entrepreneurship in the formal or informal sector, we are referring to situations where the 
subsequent venture founded after a business failure may be a registered or unregistered business. 
Indeed, entrepreneurial engagement after business failure may be triggered out of necessity or 
opportunistic-seeking behavior.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 Research Setting 
In addition to being the first sub-Saharan African nation to attain independence from colonial rule, 
Ghana has long been recognized as “Africa’s golden gateway to a safe and stable investment 
destination” (Appiah-Adu, Okpattah and Amoako, 2018, pp. 86-104). Furthermore, Ghana 
remains one of the leading nations in Africa to have “championed democracy” on the continent 
and is centrally positioned within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
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with a market of over 250 million people (Appiah-Adu et al., 2018). These, in tandem with the 
adoption of market liberalization, have created an enabling environment for new business 
formation in the country (Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 2010). For many developing countries 
such as Ghana, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have historically been ignored by policy 
makers and governments, and as such face considerably more barriers than those in the developed 
world (Appiah-Adu et al., 2018; Debrah, 2007; Hiatt and Sine, 2014). Ghana is one of the fastest 
developing and newly resource-rich nations in Africa. For decades, misguided government 
policies coupled with overemphasis on large businesses curtailed entrepreneurial development and 
growth of small business. It was hoped in the 1980s that the privatizations through the structural 
adjustment program would foster entrepreneurial development and energize a shift from reliance 
on the public sector to create jobs in the national economy towards private-sector job creation. By 
the turn of the 21st century, the vast majority of graduates and school dropouts continued to rely 
on or look up to the government to create jobs rather than venturing into entrepreneurship.  
Recent years have seen an easing of constraining regulations and national policies 
(Ghanaweb, 2017a). Ghana has also pursued economic and development policies aimed at 
fostering economic and entrepreneurial development with some notable successes (Robson and 
Freel, 2008). In addition, many taxes on small businesses have also been withdrawn to create the 
condition that encourages individuals to start businesses and for existing entrepreneurs to flourish 
(Ghanaweb, 2017a). These recent initiatives are geared towards creating a friendly regulatory 
environment and infusing entrepreneurial risk-taking into local and regional economies. The shift 
from a highly bureaucratized nation in the 1990s to a more liberalized nation in the 21st century 
has paved the way for further entrepreneurial development. Having held the dream for high-
paying government jobs for decades, many graduates and individuals have increasingly turned to 
entrepreneurship. Indeed, the government has come to regard the private sector as the primary 
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engine for economic growth. Largely due to weak legal enforcement mechanisms, the country has 
a large informal economy of unregistered businesses, thereby enabling informal entrepreneurs to 
evade regulation and avoid paying taxes. Entrepreneurs in the informal sector have often relied on 
the cash economy to do business. This means they are able to bypass the paying of taxes and 
monitoring of their activities. Although individuals engaged in business activities in the informal 
sector constitute the majority of the nation, many are left out of the tax bracket. Consequently, this 
has increased the tax burden on only 1.2 million of the 27 million population registered for tax 
purposes (Ghanaweb, 2017b). Indeed, the contribution of the informal sector to national revenue is 
less than 5% (Ghanaweb, 2017b). Besides the potential of harnessing SMEs as the backbone of 
economic development, the government can also create the platform for indigenous innovation. 
Historically, not all entrepreneurs operate by the same rules of the game with some adopting 
formal status (formal entrepreneurs) whilst others gravitate towards the informal sector (informal 
entrepreneurs).  
Method  
Given that the wider issue of the effects of prior business failure on successive entrepreneurial 
engagement and activities remains a largely unchartered territory in entrepreneurship literature, we 
employed a qualitative approach to help provide a more in-depth and comprehensive analysis 
(Birkinshaw, Brannen and Tung, 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Given 
the underdeveloped institutional setting in Ghana, we relied on mainly informal sources to identify 
formal and informal serial entrepreneurs, i.e. entrepreneurs with at least one prior experience of 
business failure. Regarding sampling strategies, besides the prior experience of failure, we also 
sought entrepreneurs operating in the regional capitals with at least one employee in the business. 
The study also utilized a snowballing approach and informal social networks such as local 
churches, business associations, family networks and local trade associations to help identify and 
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approach potential informants (Noy, 2008). In addition to these, we also offered a copy of the 
study’s findings to potential informants as an incentive for their participation. This approach has 
been found to be particularly effective in encouraging participation (Bendapudi and Leone, 2002). 
Furthermore, all the informants were assured of anonymity, which helped to gain their confidence 
and willingness to share their stories around failure. After identifying and contacting the 
informants, interviews were arranged with those who were interested in sharing their stories with 
the researchers. In line with prior scholarly guidelines by Thompson, Locander and Pollio (1989) 
and Thompson and Haytko (1997), we created or insisted on a conducive environment where the 
informants felt at ease and comfortable in sharing these sensitive experiences. Each interview was 
conducted at location selected by the informants including their offices and other suitable 
locations.  
We began the interviews by discussing the general background and experiences of the 
informants including personal interests, sports, age at time of founding and career. We enquired 
with questions on whether the prior status of the failed business was registered or unregistered and 
what the motivation was for opting for that status. We also elicited their views on why the prior 
businesses collapsed and their sources of attribution for the failure. Our next sets of questions 
were around the sources of learning from the experience of business failure. Another set of 
questions was around the pull and push factors for the formation of the new venture and status of 
the new venture (registered or unregistered). Here we also explore anticipated benefits of the 
status (i.e. registered or unregistered) and whether they were fully realized after the business 
formation. After conducting the original interviews, we followed up by enquiring about how the 
successive businesses were doing, how the global economy was impacting on their businesses, 
and to clarify ambiguities stemming from the initial interview data. The data on which this study 
is grounded were collected in different phases over time.  
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We began collecting the data from 2015 and ended in 2017. In all, we interviewed 32 serial 
entrepreneurs across different industrial settings with prior experience of failure to gain a more in-
depth analysis of the failed and successive venture. We collected hundreds of newspaper cuttings 
and online material on the plight of SMEs in Africa and Ghana. In addition, we collected 
government reports and press releases on small businesses and the barriers/impediments faced by 
local entrepreneurs. Most of the interviews were conducted by the second and third authors. The 
interviews lasted between 30 minutes to an hour. The researchers also took extensive field notes 
during the interviews. Table 1 provides a detailed summary of the informants’ details and nature 
of their operations.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Data analysis 
The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. In line with prior scholarly 
suggestions, we followed the “24-hour rule” (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Whyte, 
1982) to “capitalize on the immediacy of the data” (Gioia and Thomas, 1996, p. 374). We 
transcribed text and field notes verbatim within 24 hours of each interview. The transcripts and 
field notes were coded to help identify key themes. The data analysis proceeded in multiple stages. 
Stage one: we wrote the informants’ history encompassing reasons for business failure. We 
assembled archival data such as news reports, media reports and relevant online materials 
alongside the documents collected from the individuals and then began to construct a clear story 
line or narrative for each entrepreneur and how their venture started, reasons for collapse, their 
journey of re-entry into entrepreneurship and decisions around the status of the new businesses 
regarding whether to opt for the formal or informal sector. Stage two: we classified the 
entrepreneurs based on the reasons for the business failure, which allowed us to explore whether 
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the reasons had any connection to the method subsequently adopted. This enabled us to identify 
the different groups of entrepreneurs, sources of learning, and motives for shifts.  
From the detailed field notes and transcripts from all the interviews, we developed a clear 
narrative for all the informants and issues identified. This “part-to-whole strategy” helped in 
developing a holistic understanding of each informant’s history as well as similarities across their 
stories (Thompson, Locander and Pollio, 1989). The stage-based approach also elucidated the shift 
from raw data to theoretical interpretations (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013). Based on this 
iterative process inherent in analyzing the data (Thompson and Haytko, 1997; Thompson et al., 
1989), we observed unique patterns that captured individuals with prior experience of business 
failure who re-enter entrepreneurship through two routes: formal and informal sectors.  
FINDINGS: ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS FAILURE AS A PATHWAY TO 
FORMALITY AND INFORMALITY 
Based on the analysis, we uncovered a host of pull and push motivations for failed entrepreneurs 
maintaining prior status (unchanged from either registered or unregistered) or shift (from either 
registered or unregistered). There are two dimensions to our findings. First is pull and push 
motivations that underpin the transition into or persisting with formality after business failure. 
Second is the pull and push motivations that fortify shifting into or persisting with informality. 
Essentially, the transition period provides an opportunity for the individual to reflect and deduce 
sources of learning, marshal, and combine new resources for the basis of the new venture 
formation. As A29 asserted,  
“It was the first time a business had gone bad so it was quite a major setback, it was 
difficult to adjust... I think the period and the learning made me tolerant to certain things”. 
As A30 also added, 
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“This new business - I started it close to six years after the previous one… It wasn’t 
something that followed immediately. I had a reasonable amount of time to prepare… I 
had a parcel of land so he encouraged me to explore it. So the first thing I did was to drill 
a borehole. I had the water tested and the quality was good and meets the standard. So I 
went into sachet water production since I had the resources”.  
Figure 1 presents the processes towards transitioning from informal to formal and vice versa. 
After entry and business failure, the entrepreneurs attempt to re-enter one of the two sectors. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
The different types of shifts after business failure are from informal to informal markets, 
informal to formal markets, formal to formal markets, and formal to informal markets. By 
combining these insights, we developed and utilized the four quadrants to structure our findings 
on the motive and rationale for shifts, as demonstrated in Figure 2. The figure provides a 2×2 
matrix based on successive entrepreneurial engagement and transitions. We utilize the four-
quadrant framework to delineate our findings on the motives for different entrepreneurs.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Dimension 1: Shifting into or persisting with formality 
Quadrant I: From formal to formal. Even after business failure, some of the 
entrepreneurs still re-enter entrepreneurship via this route. The opportunities offered by formal 
status such as law and order, enforcement of rule of law, and protection for property such as land, 
buildings, contracts and patents mean that there are compelling motives for some. Our data 
16 
 
suggest that when the entrepreneurs identify clear sources of learning and do not attribute the prior 
business collapse to the firm’s “formal status”, they would re-engage using the same formal status. 
This is more so when they attribute the prior failure to lack of ability to mobilize resources or 
harsh economic situations at the time. Many sought to overcome expertise deficiencies and lack of 
knowledge revealed during the transition period after the collapse by adopting co-founding the 
new venture with a partner or mobilizing new expertise and resources prior to new venture 
formation. More importantly, the benefits of formal status and the desire to seek and increase 
legitimacy of the business, motivated them to adopt this mode. As A30 in the sachet water 
production noted, 
“It is a registered business. The registration was not based on the collapse of my first 
business but I thought it was something I should do. The water business is very sensitive 
and the food and drugs board are very hard on unregistered water producing companies… 
So the system actually forces you to register. It is a condition for producers.” 
 One entrepreneur in the exporting, importing and distribution sector captured these motives by 
noting:  
“Yes it was registered … I think I was doing too much so I decided to team up with an old 
school mate to start the new business. He had travelled to the UK, France and other places 
in Africa so I needed his experiences to succeed … I also needed a government license to 
buy the imports.” (A2) 
In discussing the recovery process and transition, A29 noted the incentives and motivation for the 
formal status,  
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“To be able to get the kind of recognition and prominence, you have to register the 
business with the government… I had a contract that was much more lucrative…When you 
register it, it (the business) becomes more prominent and the banks and other entities take 
you serious.” (A29) 
As seen above, these entrepreneurs re-entered into the formal sector due to the nature of their 
business which required some form of government licensing and approval in order to access 
resources and operate. Legitimacy of formal status also was a large motivation for persistence. It 
can also be deduced from A2’s quote that the failed company’s formal status did not act as a 
catalyst to failure and therefore a change of status to the informal sector was not needed. A2 also 
demonstrated the benefits of co-founding the new business to spread the risk and bring additional 
expertise on board to reduce the risk of another failure. Through the learning and transition period 
of eight months, this entrepreneur was able to identify the new sets of skills, knowledge and 
expertise that engender confidence for them to re-start another venture. Aside from the pragmatic 
reasons to remain in the formal sector, under conditions of uncertainty, some entrepreneurs will 
re-enter through formal status again as individuals tend to gravitate towards what they know best 
and resist some enticing alternatives. On this and related point one informant noted:  
“No, I didn't see it coming. It all started falling apart after my trip to Kumasi … I wanted 
to show I could succeed using the same mode (formal).” (A5) 
Based on the above analysis, the following is proposed: 
Proposition 1: Serial entrepreneurs will persist with formal status after experience of 
failure out of necessity rather than as an obligation.  
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Quadrant II: From informal to formal. Although some entrepreneurs transition from 
informal to formal markets with successive new ventures, our data indicate that this may stem 
from recognition of the benefits of having a formal status and learning from prior venture failure. 
Firms without formal status are often deprived access to finance, recourse to the law, and ability to 
secure loans on reasonable terms. As A32 concurred, 
“When the business failed, I had to learn and start again. I started the manufacturing 
business from home. It was doing well so my wife encouraged me to register. At the time, I 
also wanted to expand and needed banks and investors. Honestly, I do not think they will 
support me if the business was not registered.” 
Informality also creates conditions for illegality to occur where rival firms play outside the 
rules and use dark-side competitive tactics such as spreading misinformation and rumors as a 
means of gaining a competitive edge. By being seen as informal, customers and clients can 
deceive the firm knowing that the owner has little or no recourse to legal avenues to recoup their 
payments or money. These pushed some of the entrepreneurs to transition from the informal to 
formal sector. Legal status allows the firms to gain visibility and attract new customers because of 
the legitimacy rendered from their formal status. As A32 noted, 
 “Yes the new business has been registered. This is necessary for trust, appeal, confidence 
in the public, customers and so on.” 
Some of the entrepreneurs shifted from unregistered failed businesses to registered (entrepreneurs 
A26 and A10) largely due to the industrial norms of the successive venture. The quotation below 
exemplifies the importance of strong institutional frameworks and government in encouraging 




“When we were developing the business plan, I felt that registering was important. At the 
time, we were looking to win local government contracts to supply catering services to 
government officials.” (A3) 
The above arguments are rooted in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Serial entrepreneurs will shift from informal to formal when the financial 
reward is higher. 
Dimension 2: Shifting into or persisting with informality 
Quadrant III: From formal to informal. Our data also suggest that institutional 
weaknesses serve as a “push factor” in forcing individuals to abandon their previous approach of 
operating in the formal sector. The deficient legal frameworks or weak legal enforcement 
environment in the country forced some of the entrepreneurs to explore circumventing the ill-
functioning formal institutional environment. The perception of a weak institutional environment 
and failure of policy makers to strengthen the enforcement of the rule of law appears to encourage 
individuals to make this transition. While discussing the previous failure experiences, one 
entrepreneur (A7) asserted:  
“When [you] look around, you can't trust this government to enforce any rules … I cannot 
put my business into the hands of corrupt politicians.” 
In the wake of high taxes on SMEs and the tendency of some bureaucrats to demand bribes 
as a prelude to performing their duties, informality has come to be seen as the only way to ensure 
success of the successive new venture. Another motive was the belief that opting for the informal 
sectors would improve their chances of success. The potential gains in terms of non-compliances 
of government rules and taxes may be enough to offset any potential benefits offered by formal 
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status. Informality might be a more viable route for failed entrepreneurs when the route of return 
to formal entrepreneurship is shut or sealed off.  
Given the high costs of starting ventures in some sectors, some of the entrepreneurs (A7 
and A15) started their catering business from home which required little overhead with employees 
paid on an hourly basis without fringe benefits and payments. The lower start-up costs associated 
with operating in the informal sector offers a route for stigmatized and cash-constrained serial 
entrepreneurs to re-enter entrepreneurship. Although entrepreneurial activities in the informal 
sector can be viewed as an obstacle to economic development (Rakowski, 1994), our data 
indicates that the stigmatization of entrepreneurial business failure and deprivation of financial 
credit may actually push serial entrepreneurs into the informal sector. Another entrepreneur 
attributed the decision to shift to the informal sector to the wider societal perceptions of business 
failures by noting that (A8): 
“In my opinion, people do not like failure here [Ghana] … they do not want to loan you 
money or be associated with you.” 
Although unregistered enterprises often lack legitimacy (Williams, Martinez-Perez and 
Kedir, 2017), failed entrepreneurs deprived of access to financial credit would opt for this route 
before eventually transitioning to formal business. Our data indicates that in some cases where the 
entrepreneurs struggle to attract capital, they re-emerge after failure in the informal sector. Being 
able to start a new venture free from the burden and baggage of past businesses, they begin to 
repair their reputation within the wider society. By being able to hide revenues and pay workers in 
cash, entrepreneurs are able to reduce their costs and increase profit margins (The Economist, 
2016). Even prior to business failure many of the entrepreneurs faced the problem of limited 
access to capital. This was exacerbated after the business failure which devalued their operation’s 
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experiences, skills, and knowledge in the eye of local investors, including family members. In 
recounting the experience and its effects, one serial entrepreneur who operated the business from 
home asserted: 
“Yes, the elephant in the room was that people do not look kindly at this (business 
failure)… some think you are a failure.” (A15) 
Although some scholars have suggested that entrepreneurship is a career choice (Manso, 
2016), often the choice can be limited or curtailed by social factors such as prior business failure 
and societal stigmatization of failure. Although in much of the developed world the labels and 
associated stigma with business failure have decreased to an extent, it remains powerfully 
pejorative in many developing countries where failure is seen as a personal liability. The word 
“failure” can be construed as a “verbal weapon”, which can be used to deprive such individuals’ 
access to finance and resources to start another venture. Given that failure can devalue the human 
capital of entrepreneurs, the allure of operating in the informal sector is enhanced in society where 
failure is highly stigmatized. This leads us to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Serial entrepreneurs will shift from formal sector to informal when failure 
is highly stigmatized in the wider society. 
Quadrant IV: From informal to informal. Some entrepreneurs are motivated to stay 
with informal status, bypassing all formal channels because they were able to benefit from low 
overhead costs in the new informal sector. The data analysis revealed that higher taxes and 
numerous requirements for business registration have prevented some entrepreneurs from moving 
out of the informal sector to the formal sector. Although being seen as non-registered status 
conveys a lack of legitimacy, it provides such entrepreneurial new ventures with the opportunity 
to sidestep regulatory compliance costs of registration and government bureaucracy which helps to 
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improve the competitiveness of such organizations (Williams et al., 2017). As one entrepreneur 
observed (A9): 
“Let me tell you how it works. I can register with the local official and pay all the taxes or 
stay this way and pay some taxes but not all ... this is what I know.”  
 Following failure, some individuals are pushed prematurely into entrepreneurship due to 
financial strains of the failure and inability to maintain the subsistence out of new venture 
formation. By moving from earner to low or non-wage earner stemming from the business failure, 
many are pushed into entrepreneurship. The financial hardship and pressure actually push some of 
the entrepreneurs to re-enter entrepreneurship. One interviewee noted:  
“We kept hoping that things would turnaround ... in the end, there was no real option.” (A9) 
By bypassing the cost of registration and regulatory conformity, the entrepreneurs are able 
to deploy their scarce resources to source products and deliver lower prices to customers. 
Historically, unregistered firms also have their expansionary potential curtailed due to lack of 
legality and legitimacy (Williams et al., 2017). Although the workers in the informal sector are 
often lack job security and stable income, informal entrepreneurship may represent the only viable 
means from which they can earn income. For some, growing tax burdens, corruption, and risk of 
coming out of the shadows motivated them to maintain their operations in the informal sector. 
There was also a risk that they could be forced to pay back-taxes for the prior collapsed business.  
Given these constraints, entrepreneurs opt to re-enter the informal sector as the route to 
entrepreneurship. In addition, the poorly developed and lack of effective enforcements of laws and 
regulations in many emerging economies (Bruton, Fried and Minimart, 2005) often means that 
many venture capitalists back away from entrepreneurs without legitimacy and track record of 
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success. This disproportionately affects those with a failure track record, thereby hampering their 
ability to gain access to finance to re-enter entrepreneurship and transition from the informal to 
formal sector. Based on these arguments, the following proposition is offered:  
Proposition 4: Previous experience of informality by entrepreneurs will motivate them to 
select informality when it is less expensive (both in terms of money and regulatory burden) 
than formality. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of the present research was to examine the transitional path of failed 
entrepreneurs to re-enter entrepreneurship. Our analysis uncovered two dimensions to successive 
entrepreneurial engagement after previous business failure, i.e. shifting into or persisting with 
informality or formality. Based on the analysis of serial entrepreneurs in a developing economy, a 
four-quadrant framework was developed which captures the different types of shifts after business 
failures including from informal to informal,  informal to formal,  formal to formal, and  formal to 
informal sectors. In addition, our findings have shown that the prevalence of corruption has forced 
some entrepreneurs to gravitate towards the informal sector. We uncovered a host of pull and push 
factors that manifest and determine the shift for the four quadrants of successive entrepreneurial 
engagement after business failure. These broadly reflect the effects of individual level and 
institutional constraints on decisions of entrepreneurs. The study also demonstrated how desire to 
secure government contracts and customers, and address deprivation of financial credit push serial 
entrepreneurs to shift mode from their previously status (informal sector) for the failed business to 
registered status for the successive venture. Thus, the findings attest to the theoretical contention 
that business failure can alter individuals’ perspective and, in some cases, drive them to the 
informal sector or “dark side” of entrepreneurship.  
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Contributions to Theory and Practice  
The study makes several valuable contributions to theory and practice. From a theoretical 
standpoint, our study deviates from much of the existing literature on business failure 
(Amankwah‐Amoah et al., 2018; Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004; Shepherd, 2003; Zhang et al., 
2019) by developing a framework that captures the pull and push factors that motivate individuals 
to re-enter entrepreneurship after prior venture failure. Accordingly, our findings reinforce the 
theoretical contentions that resources to back fresh-start programs are essential in destigmatizing 
failure and equipping individuals to re-engage with entrepreneurship. In addition, although there 
has been a flourishing stream of research on different aspects of business failure ranging from 
human capital flows to learning from failure (Amankwah-Amoah, 2018a; Cope, 2011; Desai, 
2010), it remains unclear as to why some entrepreneurs transition from one failed venture to 
another whilst others opt out of entrepreneurship after one or more venture failure. In this regard, 
we deepen our understanding of the subject by bringing together the current disjointed body of 
work on post-business failure effects to elucidate the underlining processes. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical contributions, our findings also have important 
implications for aspiring and serial entrepreneurs. First, although many start-ups in the developing 
world are unregistered (Assenova and Sorenson, 2017; Autio and Fu, 2015), a transition from 
previously registered to unregistered can have a devastating consequence for governments and 
their revenue from business taxation. Given that as the informal economy gains stronger roots it 
becomes difficult to uproot, it might be worthwhile for the government to channel resources 
towards turning serial entrepreneurs away from the informal sector and incentivizing entry into the 
formal sector. There is a need to disentangle the notion of informal economy from criminal 
endeavors towards creating incentives for formality (AFDB, 2013; Debrah, 2007). A national tax 
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campaign would be useful in encouraging entrepreneurs in the informal sector to transition into 
the formal economy and meet their tax obligations willingly (Ghanaweb, 2017b). 
In addition, because entrepreneurial business failure has become increasingly common, it 
is a strategic and practical imperative to explore the path to transition from one failed venture to 
another. Given that business failure often deprives many entrepreneurs of access to resources and 
financial markets, it is very likely that such individuals may spend a temporary short period of 
time as unregistered businesses before registering. By creating a path out of informality after 
business failure, government would help to improve working conditions for employees and 
ultimately reduce poverty. More so, given that entrepreneurial activities in the informal sector are 
viewed as an obstacle to economic development, there is a need for better access to financing for 
serial entrepreneurs, government services and resource mobilization towards de-stigmatization. 
These would help to create incentives for registration of new businesses. Moreover, there is a need 
for more entrepreneurs to view prior business failure as an opportunity to try again rather than 
become paralyzed by the experience. This means developing a notion that humans are changeable 
and failure can be turned into future success in the wider society. This also means devoting 
resources toward educating and showcasing examples of failed entrepreneurs that have re-emerged 
to help alter social perception towards business failure. This can provide a basis for mobilization 
of national resources towards self-improvement programmers and provide opportunities for re-
entry after prior venture failure.  
Limitations and future directions 
There are some limitations to the approaches adopted. A limitation of the analysis relates 
to the applicability of the conceptual framework to other different institutional environments. 
Given that empirical research on successive entrepreneurial engagement after business failures is 
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still in its infancy (Hessels et al., 2011), it might be worthwhile for future research to explore this 
in other or similar institutional environments. Second, the paper is based on a single country with 
a very small sample. This limits the generalizability of the analysis. Another possible area of 
worthwhile investigation is whether an individual’s age, religion and gender may play a role in 
societal attributions of business failure. This is likely to affect an individual’s ability to bounce 
back after business failure. It might be useful for future studies to compare the competitiveness of 
formal and informal entrepreneurs in the same industry. This might shed some light on whether 
formal entrepreneurs are hampered or helped by competition with informal entrepreneurs. It is 
hoped that this paper helps to foster new streams of research on this unique area. 
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Figure 1: A four-cell typology of transitions after business failure 
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Industry of failed firm Status of the failed 
business: (registered 
with government or 
unregistered ) 
Motive for registered or 
unregistered status  
Timeframe (the 
period from exit to 
new business 
formation) 
Background of new 
business/industry or 





Status of the new 
business: (registered 
with government or 
unregistered ) 
A1 Communications 
provider for house 
buyers and renters 
Registered with 
government 
Benefits from bank loans which 
require formal status 
1 year Established a web-
based service for new 
companies 
Benefits from 








To obtain necessary licence to 
underpin the business 
8 months. Exporting, importing, 
and distribution 
Formal status To obtain licence 
A3 Restaurant and night club Unregistered Not necessary at the time 4 years Catering business Formal status To help secure 
government contract 
A4 Catering services Unregistered Was able to benefit from formal 
status 
1 year  Catering business Registered To help secure bank loans 
for future expansion 
A5 Computer support 
services 
Registered Licence was needed to underpin 
the services. Influences of 
formal institutions such as 
codified laws and regulations 
13 months Computer support 
services 
Registered Personal perseverance and 
proof people wrong 
A6 Transportation services 
for small firms 
Unregistered Operated the business from 
home 
3 years Transportation 
services for small 
firms 
Registered To tap benefits offered by 
formal status 
A7 Hospitality business 
(catering services) 
Formal (registered with 
government) 
To provide services to local 
schools and a University 
1 year Hospitality business Informal market Rising cost, economic 
hardship and taxes 
A8 Printing press  Formal (registered with 
government) 
Semi-formal- paid some local 
taxes to operate 
2 years Established new retail 
shop 
Formal  Acquire benefits of 
formal status.  
A9 “Susu” business Unregistered “Susu” business is based on 
social network and family 
contacts rather than government 
certificate 
2 years Family owned nursery 
school 
Registered Nature of the business and 
government requirements 
for nursery school 
A10 Local restaurant 
 
Not registered Operated the business from 
home 
3 years Established a drinking 




To comply with 
regulations 
A11 Food processing Incorporated with 
registrar generals 
To attract new businesses and be 
seen as legitimate 
2years  Yoghurt making Unregistered  Wants to grow the 
business before 
registering 
A12 Hospitality (catering 
services) 
Registered with the 
government 
To attract business from 
MMDA 
1yr Contract catering for 
weddings, parties, 
funerals etc. 
Unregistered  Combines that with their 
permanent job 
A13 Sale of electrical 
appliances 
Registered with the 
municipal assembly 
To comply with the law and 
play by the rules 
2.5yrs No new business 
because had a 
permanent job with 
Zoomlion 
Undisclosed N/A 
A14 Office supply and 
stationery 
Registered To be able to supply to 
government agencies 
7yrs Unable to start a new 
business 
 N/A 
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A15 Hospitality (catering 
services) 
Registered with the 
Ghana Tourist Board 
To comply with Law 2yrs  Contract catering 
during Weddings, 
funerals etc. 
Unregistered Because operated from 
home and also not an 
everyday business 
A16 Food processing Registered with 
government 
To comply with the Food and 
Drugs law 
2yrs  Processing and sale of 
sachet water 
Registered To comply with Law 
A17 Building and 
construction 
Registered with all the 
government agents  
To be able to win contract 4yrs  Small shop to sell 
assorted products 
Registered  To satisfy the municipal 
assembly 
A18 Sale of hair products Unregistered  Sold from the house to students 3yrs Food processing In the process of 
registering with 
food and drugs 
authority 
On experimental basis 
A19 Sale of cosmetics  Unregistered  Sold to friends and people in 
their networks 
1 yr. Artificial hair Not registered but 
will register 
To friends and people in 
their networks 
A20  Pastry services Registered  To be able to supply to 
government agencies 
2yrs  Fast food joints Registered Comply with law and to 
attract bank loans 
A21 Mobile shop of assorted 
items 
Not registered  Sold to friends and colleagues at 
Work 
1yr Stationery firm Not registered  Operated from home 
A22 Saw mills parts dealer Not registered  Undisclosed Under a year.  Undisclosed. N/A. 
A23 Management services Registered  To get contract from 
government agencies 
2yrs  Organized software 
training for 
accountancy students 
Registered  To win confidence from 
the students 
A24 Second hand clothes Not registered  Moved from market to market 3yrs  Hardware shop Incorporated To attract business and 
loans 
A25 Barbering shop Registered with the 
municipal assembly 
To avoid confrontation with the 
law 
2yrs  Mobile money 
transfer 
Registered To comply with the 
requirement 
A26 Contract catering Not registered  Operated the business from 
home 
3yrs  Established a local 
restaurant 
Registered To comply with the law 
A27 Carpentry shop Registered  To get contract from the 
government 
4yrs  Established a saw mill Registered  In line with law 
A28 Building and 
construction 
Registered  To get contracts from the 
municipal assembly 
2yrs  Established a sachet 
water business 
Registered with 
food and drugs 
board 
Comply with Law 
A29 Preschool  Registered Legal requirement 3 yrs lifestyle 
Events/Emporium 
Registered Benefits of legal status 
A30 Small distributorship- 
distributing soft drinks 
Registered Demanded by partner and legal 
requirement 
2.5yrs Sachet water 
production 
Registered Benefits of legal status 
A31 Specialized in sale of 
selling of software to law 
firms and filling stations. 
Registered. To obtain certificate and 
legitimize the business 
10yrs Import and export Registered To comply with the law 
A31 A cleaning Company Registered  Legal requirement 5 months Cleaning firm Not registered  Wants to build on more 
clients first 
A32 Entertainment, clothing 
and food outlet 
Unregistered    Not full time business 2yrs Shoes manufacturing Registered  Comply with law and to 
attract investors 
 
